Wanted: Tactical Radio Strategy

GAO calls for priorities to guide decisions on legacy radios,
upgraded radios and the new generation represented by JTRS.

The Department of Defense has spent an estimated $12 billion on the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years. To put this investment in context, the amount spent on tactical radios is comparable to the estimated investments made in the Army’s Future Combat Systems ($10.4 billion) and the Navy’s production of Virginia Class submarines ($10.8 billion) during the same period.

Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and communication capabilities. Moving this information— including bandwidth-intensive data and video—to, from and across the battlefield requires breakthroughs in radio technology. DoD’s existing or “legacy” radios lack the capacity and flexibility necessary to achieve and maintain this level of information superiority.

DoD is counting on the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), a development program begun in 1997, to deliver the needed breakthrough. JTRS relies on networked communications to improve information sharing, collaboration and situational awareness, thus enabling more rapid and effective decision-making and execution on the battlefield. It is intended to provide the bandwidth volume to handle the information traffic, emulate different legacy radios, and function as a router for tactical networks. The design of some new weapon systems, such as the Future Combat Systems, depends on a JTRS-equipped network.

At the same time DoD is developing JTRS for future forces, it is striving to ensure that current forces are equipped with legacy radios to carry out assigned missions. DoD is confronted with the challenge of balancing the investment in both current and future radios—a dynamic proposition given that current needs change and future capabilities do not necessarily proceed predictably.

To determine whether DoD and the military services are acquiring radios in the most cost-efficient and effective manner and address capability gaps, and determine funding needs, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces requested that GAO study how effectively DoD and the military services are managing the acquisition of radio systems. Specifically, we (1) examined how the services’ planned investments in key tactical radio systems have changed over the last 5 years, (2) determined why these changes occurred, and (3) identified challenges that will confront the services as they plan tactical radio investments to provide desired future capabilities.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To assess tactical radio investments and risks, we reviewed fiscal year 2003 through 2007 budget requests, procurements of legacy radios for that time period, the current status of the JTRS program, and JTRS migration plans. We interviewed agency officials from various DoD and service organizations and reviewed plans and reports produced by defense organizations.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

Over the past five years, DoD investments in key tactical radios have shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when the JTRS program began system development, DoD planned to invest close to $3 billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007—about $1 billion to develop and test the radios and another $2 billion to start procuring them. Investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. For example, the Army and Marine Corps planned to spend only about $235 million between 2003 and 2007 on legacy radios for ground vehicles and soldiers/Marines. However, actual investments more than doubled and shifted away from planning to produce JTRS to producing thousands more legacy radios.

Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development. Other than fielding an enhanced legacy handheld radio, no JTRS networking radios were produced or fielded during this time.

The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by two primary factors: (1) delays in the development and production of JTRS and (2) urgent demands for additional radios to equip current forces. JTRS encountered significant cost, schedule and performance problems early in its development. The program was restructured in 2006, resulting in the deferral of some capabilities and the addition of much more time and funding to complete development.

While prudent, the restructuring delayed the fielding of the first JTRS Ground Mobile Radios by five years to 2010. Because of the delay, some users who were depending on JTRS, such as Army helicopter programs, had to buy more legacy radios instead. At the same time, however, the military services’ demand for tactical radios soared—a demand that was met by buying tens of thousands of legacy radios. The demand was fueled by combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to equip Guard and Reserve forces with modern radios, and a change in the Army and Marine Corps’ concept of operations that calls for more radios per combat unit.

The resultant investments in legacy radios have evolved from year to year, as the services reacted to needs that cropped up, and were largely enabled by supplemental funding, which supplied most—an estimated $5.5 billion—of the additional funds. Because DoD developed the supplemental budgets relatively quickly and without the level of review and oversight normally required through the regular annual budget process, there was limited visibility into the services’ plans for acquiring tactical radios. In addition, a waiver/notification process established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to help manage the transition from legacy radios to JTRS has not been effective in tracking the nature and extent of tactical radio investments.

Over the next five years, DoD faces several challenges in providing needed tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter: completing JTRS development, managing investments within tighter fiscal constraints, and developing a fielding strategy for tactical radios. While JTRS is making progress, the program must still overcome technology hurdles, size and power constraints, and security architecture issues to avoid further delays.

The high cost of JTRS has also become an increasing concern. Currently, a legacy vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its JTRS replacement, albeit significantly more capable, is estimated to cost up to 10 times more. In addition, the cost of integrating JTRS with existing weapons systems is expected to be substantial in some cases. Thus, the decision to put more radios in each combat unit may not be sustainable with the more costly JTRS. In fact, the military services have begun to scale back the number of JTRS radios they plan to buy and rethink how JTRS capabilities will be fielded.

Since the recently purchased legacy radios are expected to have a useful life of 10-15 years, fielding JTRS without phasing out legacy radios prematurely will necessitate striking a balance between capability and cost. For example, DoD may have to consider whether the investment priority for JTRS should be on network-dependent systems, like the Army’s Future Combat Systems, or for replacing legacy radios. Available funding, absent continued high levels of supplemental budgets, will likely not support meeting both sets of needs. However, DoD does not have a strategy for balancing its future tactical radio investments, as previous plans are outdated.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop an investment strategy that establishes priorities to guide resource decisions on legacy radios, upgraded radios, and the new generation of radios that JTRS represents. We are also recommending that such a strategy provide discipline to bound investment decisions, such as a reinvigorated notification/waiver process, as well as a back-up plan in the event that JTRS does not provide the desired capabilities on time. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD agreed with these recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS

While weapon system investments are normally associated with major platforms such as aircraft and ships, DoD’s investment in radios rivals the cost of some of its largest acquisition programs. As DoD looks ahead at its tactical radio investments over the next five years, it faces a less ambitious, yet more complicated undertaking than it did in 2003. DoD hopes to complete development and begin production of JTRS within the next few years. Yet, this is a downsized JTRS program that initially offers less capability than originally planned.

Instead of being able to phase out old legacy radios as planned, DoD now faces a much larger inventory of relatively new legacy radios and improved interim radios with much useful life left in them. Phasing out these radios will necessarily be more deliberate given the huge costs already expended and the expected high price of JTRS sets. While much of the increased investment in radios since 2003 has been ad hoc, reactionary and enabled by large supplemental budgets, this may have been unavoidable. However, this does not mean that the next five years should follow suit. Rather, DoD needs to regain control over tactical radio investments so that the best mix of capabilities can be procured with a judicious expenditure of funds.

Having an investment strategy that establishes priorities, discipline and contingency plans will be essential to making good decisions, particularly when predictability is elusive. While DoD and the services are making a series of decisions on a case-by-case basis to reconcile JTRS investments with lower-cost alternatives and relatively young legacy radio inventories, this approach could make future capabilities a product of such decisions rather than the strategic choice it should be. DoD does not have such a strategy today, and its previous migration plans and its waiver/notification process have been overtaken by events.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION

To improve DoD’s ability to plan for and manage the development and fielding of tactical radios across the department, we recommend that the secretary of defense develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for making sound investment decisions for tactical radios that:

•      Is based on operational architectures that define the communications and networking functions needed on the battlefield
  
•      Assesses and prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed in the near and long term
  
•      Sets bounds for the funding that will be committed to address these needs
  
•      Lays out an effective migration and fielding plan for delivering capabilities to the warfighter, and
  
•      Identifies contingencies in case there are further problems and delays with JTRS.

We also recommend that the secretary of defense reinvigorate the tactical radio notification/waiver process to provide departmentwide insight into the continued procurement of legacy and interim radios. In doing so, consideration should be given to ensuring clear guidance and procedures are developed and communicated across the department.

DEPARTMENT RESPONSE

The department concurs with both of the GAO recommendations. The GAO report and recommendations are consistent with the measures taken by the department to develop a comprehensive strategy and plan for optimizing investments in future systems, such as JTRS, while balancing the need for further investments in current systems. ♦