New Approach Needed in Iraq

THE “TOP TO BOTTOM” APPROACH NOT WORKING FOR IRAQI TROOP TRAINING.

My name is Mark Mosher and I have been intimately involved in the training of Iraqi troops and police service personnel. I spent a year in Ramadi, Iraq running a team of Marines, State Department personnel and third country national interpreters. It was an extremely dangerous assignment but professionally very gratifying. My missions around Al Anbar Province took me into the reconstruction zones of Fallujah, connecting highways through Habbaniya, Ramadi and up through the Western Euphratres River Valley to the Syrian border. All the while conducting training, refocusing efforts for the coalition trainers, vulnerability assessments of forts, defensive emplacements and enhancements, firefights, suicide bombers, snipers, liars, robbers, smugglers, radical Islamists, recruiting efforts, police selection, local politics...The list goes on and on.

I returned to the states in February 2006 and have since developed training and education for the II Marine Expeditionary Force transition teams assigned to duty in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are good men from all over the Marine Corps and probably the Army being assigned to this duty who are not the right fit yet we’re doing it anyway. Maybe at the highest levels our leadership believes the conditions are set to send idealists out there but it is no environment for anything less than professionals with special operations backgrounds, not Lawrence of Arabia wannabe’s venturing now and then into the hinterland. The key is to stay out there, stay engaged with locals and make progress happen with an Iraqi face on it. I can assure you that the “top to bottom” approach espoused by the generals is not the way this should be done. I have been fortunate in my career to have been trained in a variety of special operations schools and units and have conducted combat there in small teams. As a leader of specialized teams it is the experience that counts most as the bottom line, not the rank some major or lieutenant colonel wears on his collar pushing a half-baked plan on subordinates that are probably not organized, trained or equipped to do idiotic acts for ribbons he will ultimately receive and they will not.

BEHIND THE POWER CURVE

Bottom line is nationally we are two years behind the power curve in making this nation-building extravaganza happen. We have created more enemies as a result rather than allies, and nationalism is very much not taking hold as our popular support base here at home is only aware of. This will take generations of effort to contain Iraqi militancy, further, nihilist Islamists still looking for the WMD event of the century. Our attempts at assimilation with Iraqi Security Forces will inevitably cause future blowback much the same as Afghan Mujihideen continuously demonstrate in their loyalty to Al Qaeda. I’m not nay-saying, I am only sharing what I believe will happen in the near future if the right small units do not do their jobs properly once deployed. It’s not the generals’ perspective from on high that changes things in the small villages or even places like Ramadi. It will be highly intelligent, well-trained and equipped and humanly compassionate American men and women doing the right thing at the moment. Not grand strategy.

TRANSITION TEAM DEVELOPMENT (PRE-DEPLOYMENT)

In the rest of this article, I will address my history in Al Anbar Province supporting II Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) Iraqi Security Force (ISF) Directorates efforts while stationed in Ramadi, Iraq, and upon return to Camp Lejeune. Those efforts were in some ways paralleled in Fallujah as well as other areas of operation throughout the country by other Marines and soldiers. Initially team members for the Ministry of Interior (MOI) Mobile Training Team (MTT) were recruited and selected from a pool of reserve Marine volunteers that had civilian law enforcement or security operations backgrounds. The military occupational specialties (MOS) represented reconnaissance, infantry, military police, logistics, intelligence and communications.

At reserve mobilization an in-house training period of approximately one month of subjects relative to the team’s perceived mission was conducted in conjunction with the CENTCOM pre-deployment requirements, such as escalation of force/rules of engagement, media awareness, detainee handling, combat stress briefing, nuclear/ biological/chemical (NBC) training. The additional subjects were based on my military education and experience special missions units. This subject matter was as follows:

Instructor/Trainer/Advisor Development

• The learning process
• Effective communication
• Control of interest
• Learning objectives
• Methods of instruction
• Test construction and analysis
• Training aids
• After-action review and feedback
• Instructor duties and responsibilities
• Use of interpreters
• Marine Corps planning process
• Mission Essential Task List’s (METL), mission performance standards and individual training standards
• Mobile Training Team (MTT) Organization
• Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Command relationships and organization No language training was available during this time frame

Mission Essential Tasks for IPS

• Establish shifts
• Armory procedures and storage of dangerous devices
• Physical security of the police station
• Proper dispatch procedures
• Operate a motor pool and PMCS
• Emergency response protocols

Foreign Internal Defense

• Planning FID activities
• MTT Imperitives
• Site surveys
• Marksmanship instructor training
• Cross-cultural communication and rapport building

Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism

• Level One training anti-terrorism training; terrorist operations in Iraq, individual protective measures, detecting terrorist surveillance, IED’s, hostage survival
• Code of Conduct training/SERE

Marksmanship Training

• American weapons
• Threat weapons
• Combat shooting/tactics
• Team operations; open air movement, IA drills, MOUT/CQB considerations, vehicle operations.

Tactical Operations

• Offense/defense/raids/reconnaissance
• Operations orders
• Intelligence/information operations
• Coordination
• Rehearsals and inspections
• Continuing actions and Standard Operating Procedure development
• C4I2 systems and usage

Advanced Medical Training

• Combat casualty care
• MEDEVAC/CASEVAC training
• Situational training exercises

Mobile Force Protection

• Convoy operations
• Mobile patrolling; military vehicles and non-standard vehicles
• Personnel security detachments operations

Fire Support Operations

• Artillery/mortar ops
• Close air support
• Integrated Simulations Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT)

Fundamentals of Unconventional Warfare (UW)

• Asset debriefing
• Guerrilla warfare
• Guerilla organizations
• The Underground
• The Auxiliary
• The area command and complex
• Sabotage and subversion
• Base camps in UW
• Introduction to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations
• Counter-guerilla operations
• Insurgent activity indicators; rural and urban
 
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program training & combat fitness

All of this while training the II MEF ISF Directors personal security detachment!!!

DEPLOYMENT

The combined team deployed in March 2005 initially to Camp Fallujah. Within a week I and my intelligence specialist were forward-deployed to Camp Blue Diamond near Ramadi to begin an assessment of the Provincial Iraqi Police Headquarters at the government center in central Ramadi to determine who was who in that zoo. The team expanded, too, within a week with two more enlisted Marines, two interpreters and a small team of State Department International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO’s). We also relocated to Camp Ramadi just across the Euphrates and better positioned to get into town. Later we added our officer team leader who would serve as the primary governmental engagement officer concerning the MOI. Once the initial site survey was conducted and the results were reported the team set about to the task of organizing for a variety of IP reconstitution efforts that ranged from enduring team tasks, IP personnel and training issues and facilities and equipment issues.

These were monumental efforts in the face of the enemy, and developing a battle rhythm in coordination with coalition forces current and future campaign plans and set-aside logistics to support the teams operational and training needs.

The team found itself engulfed in what we called “an evening with the Soprano’s” on a daily basis with a variety of Iraqi government characters such as the Al Anbar governor, provincial police chief and his chain of command, to include highway patrol, city and traffic police representatives, local sheiks, and other ministry representatives assigned from Baghdad to duty in Ramadi. It was a snake pit of intrigue and tragic comedy.

The team used its MEF level influence to assist in quality of life issues to support the Marine grunts manning the guard at the government center or Army grunts charged with the various districts security. Food, engineer support, barrier materials, training and technical security support. They in turn provided us armored mobility and physical security on patrols and during leader engagements in some very dangerous sites.

CULTURE LEARNING

In the Arab world the week begins on our Sunday and basically ends on Thursday in the afternoon. The team took this as opportunity to review the week’s activities thoroughly and train. All hands, military and civilian were required to attend advanced marksmanship training that included re-zeroing rifles/carbines, live fire close-quarters battle drills, especially with the pistol, and immediate action drills based on current enemy attacks. For those hours of effort I watched these men grow more cohesive and assimilate an aggressive attitude of readiness to get back out there and make progress.

As our operations became a little more well known to local commanders our services became scalable and organized. We created a four-step continuous process that included formalized defined coordination between coalition forces and Iraqi officials in the form of (1) recruiting and screening Iraqi men for police duty, (2) preparing plans that gave limited operationalizing of the IP’s, (3) create slow expansion through conditions-based activity and readiness assessments, then further development based on (4) security conditions and recent performance of the IP as a whole. This takes time and this puts you right in the middle of the action daily. It takes an extreme amount of patience therefore maturity and professionalism have to be the standard.

By September 2005 all of the first team of Marines were rotating home. I had the choice to remain in Ramadi and carry on the mission. It was a good choice, because when I received the new crew I was very dissatisfied with these people. They had received virtually no training relative to the mission except combat life saver training and would learn the hard way had I not stayed. And in a couple of cases they would. I was not pleased with the leadership who began to plan activity in secret although I had far more experience than either of the two new officers and would regularly plan “sound byte” activity outside the scope of the success we’d already created. Their attitude of open disregard undermined my authority and the new team began to fragment in their personal worlds to quest for combat action ribbons and medals for valor.

I set about to train and educate these men in combat. I took them to the range and began to work them in their full battle kit to check fitness and discipline before I assigned them to the government center or patrols. They experienced their first incident that morning when, as we shot small arms, the Joint Coordination Center (JCC) was hit by several mortar rounds causing a mass casualty incident. I had the Marines clear their weapons and we then moved to the medical center to assist with casualty care. A couple of them attempted excuses. I didn’t tolerate it. An hour and half later these men had put to practice what little they thought they knew. I was more than aware these people had no capability whatsoever and were going to be assigned some very dangerous work beginning the next day somewhere in Ramadi. I was becoming very angry with the chain of command for the level of deficiency found in these human resources, but through that same energy I found the patience and professionalism discussed earlier; I managed to train and educate these men in a variety of ways and re-grow some capability.

REDEPLOYMENT

I came back to the U.S. in February 2006 exhausted mentally and physically. Instead of assigning me to a relevant activity to my recent experience in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom I was told not to unpack my seabags and I was headed to Colombia for a year. This completely violated current policy regarding combat tours and home station “dwell time”. I went into physical therapy and other medical procedure and all the while being pressured to go to Colombia then Guantanamo since “they had outstanding medical facilities.” I sought out my former director who assisted me in once again coming under his command and developing a stateside transition team training program. My efforts here concentrated on not only the obvious USMC pre-deployment training program which is a pipeline approach but work toward team development in the following areas:

• Civ-mil operations
• Combat operations
• Mobility operations
• Political
• Command and staff

These areas were applied in a matrix of typical actions associated with each category above. In some cases during the train up contractor support was required in order to exercise the new teams appropriately. The matrix was also a tool used during the conduct of mission planning during the mission rehearsal exercises. With this tool I was able to demonstrate interdependence and respect for each category, and without this developed knowledge and practical application one should be prepared for a human reaction of some sort by the Iraqi’s. An example of this was a point raid into a small village by an Iraqi unit supported by a military transition team (MiTT). Instead of using their intelligence appropriately and conducting an assault, they instead awoke a neutral sheik who may have had sympathetic ties to the insurgency. He was questioned outside his home during a timesensitive activity and refused to cooperate. First indication of possible insurgent support. The MiTT leader, a lieutenant colonel came up to me and stated he was befuddled, basically asking for advice. I just told him “I’m not here.” After another 30 minutes of making noise in the middle of the night, the team finally decided to go to the assigned objective and take it down. They located the high value target (HVT) person as well as locating a huge weapons cache. Instead of calling for a heavier force to come in and assist with the security environment they instead extracted to their base. Failed decision. What was once a neutral village now was becoming militant and showed up at the base in demonstration of the arrest of the HVT and perceived disappearance of their sheik. This all unraveled into a riot with suicide bombers, mass casualties, onthe- spot HUMINT exploitation and finally capture of the sheik who was an auxiliary supporter of Al Qaeda in Iraq and a weapons smuggler. All in a days work for transition teams. The lesson was your decisions must be imperative-driven or you will suffer consequences. These imperatives are as follows in order to successfully lead and manage a coordinated transition team program: understand the operational environment, recognize political implications, facilitate interagency activities, engage the threat discriminately, consider long-term effects, ensure legitimacy and credibility of operations, anticipate and control psychological effects, apply capabilities indirectly, develop multiple options, ensure long-term sustainment, provide sufficient intelligence, and balance security and synchronization.

MISSION DANGER

The danger will always be there in the conduct of this mission. That question need not be asked. Another reason why all DoD members should first be trained as infantryman, taught what their jobs really are in the tactical sense with formal introduction and sustainment in culture, language and force protection to the highest attainable level of proficiency. ♦

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