Q&A: Major General George J. Flynn
Warrior Trainer
Training Transition Teams for Iraq

Major General George J. Flynn
Commanding General, Training and
Education Command,
U.S. Marine Corps
Major General Flynn graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1975. He holds a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations from Salve Regina College, a Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, and a Master of Science Degree in National Security and Strategy from the National War College. He is a distinguished graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff and the National War College. Major General Flynn’s command assignments include: Commanding Officer, HQ Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines; (1979-1980); Commanding Officer, L Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines (1980); Commanding Officer, P Battery, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (1984-1985); Commanding Officer, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (1992-1993); Commanding Officer, Officer Candidates School (1999-2001), Commanding General, Training Command (2002-2004). Major General Flynn’s staff assignments include: Forward Observer, Fire Direction Officer, Battery Executive Officer and S-4 A, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines (1976-1979); Officer Selection Officer, Manchester, New Hampshire, (1981-1984), Operations Officer, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (1985-1986), Plans Officer, Plans Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters Marine Corps (1987-1989); Junior Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (1989- 1991); Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, 2nd Marine Division (1991-1992); Future Operations Officer, III Marine Expeditionary Force (1994-1995); Military Assistant to the Executive Secretary to the Secretary of Defense (1995-1997); Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations (1997-1998); Head, Strategic Initiatives Group, Headquarters Marine Corps (1998-1999); Military Secretary to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (2001-2002); Deputy Commanding General, Training and Education Command (2002-2004). Chief of Staff and Director, Command Support Center, United States Special Operations Command (2004-2006). His personal decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Legion of Merit with three gold stars, the Meritorious Service Medal with the Navy-Marine Corps Commendation Medal with gold star.
Q: What is the mission of the United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) and what is your job as commander?
A: To develop, coordinate, resource, execute and evaluate training and education concepts, policies, plans and programs to ensure Marines are prepared to meet the challenges of present and future operational environments. Job as commander, to provide vision, ensure a shared understanding of the vision throughout the command, and champion the fight for resources to make the vision a reality.
Q: What are your goals and objectives for TECOM?
A: We must continue to ensure that our Marines are fully prepared to meet the challenges of the present as well as future operational environments. To meet those challenges we must: continue to adjust the pre-deployment training program in response to changing conditions and lessons learned; improve training available at home station to include increased Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) training and simulation; expand advisor training to ensure Marines are prepared to undertake and excel at this critical mission; establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence built upon the foundation of the Center for Advance Operational Culture Learning; establish robust and integrated training programs that exercise the full-spectrum of MAGTF operations, maintains MAGTF proficiency in core warfighting functions, and integrates joint/coalition/and interagency operations; enhance our entry level training and increase participation at all levels in professional military education programs; and increase use of technology to make training more realistic.
Q: What role is TECOM playing in the Global War on Terror?
A: TECOM has served as the primary change agent within the Marine Corps for responding to the global war on terror. Training and education has been and will continue to be the foundation in preparing the Marine Corps for this fundamentally human endeavor. We are seeing a dramatically increased burden of responsibility on our junior leaders in the conduct of independent, dispersed operations ranging from rebuilding infrastructure to hunting down insurgents. This requires well-educated and well-trained Marines who can rapidly and effectively transition between wide varieties of tactical activities, while never losing focus on the preeminently strategic significance of their actions. A major challenge we have faced in responding to the GWOT is the implementation of increased training requirements without an accompanying increase in the time to train. We must continually try to increase quality and effectiveness of training. With current restrictions on increasing the amount of time dedicated to training in a Marine’s enlistment, we must be innovative in finding ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of it. For example, we are increasing the use of distance learning, simulation and commercial, off-the-shelf education and training tools such as language training systems.
Q: What is a Transition Team (TT) and what is the Marine Corps approach to TT training? What roles are Transition Teams playing in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for the U.S. military?
A: A Transition Team is generally a small group of officers, Staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers [10 to 30 total] with skills in ground maneuver, fire support, logistics, intelligence and communications who advise, train and mentor Iraqi and Afghani security forces in military, border security and national police operations. The Marine Corps provides five Transition Team variations: Military Transition Team [MiTTs], Border Transition Team [BTTs], Police Transition Team [PTTs], and the National Police Transition Team [NPTTs].
Q: How important is the training of Iraq’s security forces in winning the global war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan?
A: Training Iraq and Afghan security forces builds their national capacity for conducting internal and external security operations to ensure the stability of their elected governments. Capacity building of national government security forces is an important key to winning the global war on terror.
Q: How many Marines are currently deployed in OIF/OEF and how many of them are part of the security transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan? What does the training for a Transition Team consist of and how long does the training occur before a team is ready to deploy?
A: At any given time in Iraq, we have 46 Teams operating. The breakdown is as follows:
20 SMC-sourced MiTTs in Iraq [12—365 day/eight—210 day ]; 10 BTTs [two—365 day/eight—210 day]; four NPTTs [365 day]; 12 PTTs [210 day—as of September, went from nine to 12]; Total: 46 Teams. However, if you take into account all of the 210 day teams; this is the number that actually needs to be trained every year: 12—365 day MiTTs; 16—210 day MiTTs; two—365 day BTTs; 16—210 day BTTs; four—365 day NPTTs; 24—210 day PTTs; for a total of 74 Iraq Teams deploying per year. There are currently seven Embedded Training Teams (ETT) in Afghanistan: one Corps ETT; five Bn ETTs; one HQ Security Bn ETT.
The Bn and Corps ETTs are 16 members strong [plus at least one USN Corpsman]. The HSB ETT consists of nine men. The Corps ETT is lead by an 0-6, each of the Battalions by either an O-4 or O-5 and the HSB by an O-4 with a mix of specialties including combat arms, logistics, communications, intelligence, and medical, in grades from E-4 through O-4.
Q: What have been the biggest challenges to the success of TECOM and how has the command tried to deal with these challenges?
A: TECOM is a relatively young organization that was established in July 2000, shortly before 9/11. As such we have been faced with the dual task of establishing the command and defining roles, functions and responsibilities at the same time that we have needed to ensure we remained flexible in our training programs to meet the threats posed by an adaptive and thinking enemy. Despite the challenges we have instituted truly transformational training programs that have favorably improved the operational readiness of our units while at the same time maturing the command.
Q: When discussing Iraqi Forces Training, what have been the biggest challenges to the training of Iraq’s security forces, and what do you think needs to be done to help overcome these challenges?
A: Logistics capability, or the lack thereof, is currently one of the largest challenges we face in supporting Iraqi forces. In Multi National Force-West, the 1st IA(?) Division is at or near 100% for critical Modified Table of Organization and Equipment [MTOE] items, while the 7th IA Division is at -75 percent of critical MTOE items. They are adequately equipped to train; however, equipment readiness is a significant issue. Ammunition is problematic, as the Iraqi process that we are bound to is new and fraught with challenges. IA Divisions are still learning to process and submit appropriate paperwork in a timely fashion; Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), which receives and acts on the requests, is marginally functional. The objective or quantitative measure of readiness is the TRA report. Multi National Corps-Iraq is currently executing plans to improve the overall readiness of the Iraq Army units. The plan includes improvements in this area.
Q: How is the success of a Transition Team measured? Should the performance of an Iraqi unit be considered a reflection of the Transition Team’s proficiency?
A: In the simplest terms, a Transition Team’s success is dependent in many cases on intangibles that include the degree of competency and willingness displayed by the Iraqi units and that would include the ISF unit stability, whereby the Marine Team has the opportunity to spend optimal time interacting and training with the Iraqi Security Forces unit. However, to a certain extent, an Iraqi unit’s proficiency could certainly be linked to the capability of the Transition Team supporting them. Each month, the MiTTs complete a Training Readiness Assessment [TRA]. There MiTTs report TRA levels to MNF-W who subsequently passes that evaluation to the IAG at MNC-I. IAG is the final authority for assessments.
Q: What changes has TECOM made in its training program for Marines—particularly those serving as training advisors and Transition Team personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan—through lessons learned from commanders, advisors and TT’s in-theater that have served there?
A. The training of Transition Teams is based on several factors, to include; the guidelines as set forth in the Combatant Commander’s Request for Forces [RFF] and feedback from returning teams, as well as the established lessons-learned process. In many cases, recent changes or additions, such as additional culture and language, foreign weapons, and the use of scenario-based training that immerses the team in culture events, has been taken in many cases from the feedback derived from returning teams and the formal lessons-learned process.
Q: What can industry do to best help TECOM accomplish its mission?
A: Industry needs to deliver quality training devices and training software in a timely fashion that meet all specified training requirements and within established and agreed upon costs. As a Marine Corps at war, we need the most reliable training devices fielded in the shortest possible time while maintaining the maximum level of training “up” time. To do this, industry needs to provide responsive and continuous support after the training devices are fielded. The Marine Corps needs industry to produce training devices that operate together in an interoperable and complementary fashion [not solely in the case of our weapons, equipment and vehicles]. Everything we develop and field in the future must be able to be modular, plug and play with full CI3 [Compatibility, Integrated, Interconnected, Interoperable]; i.e., our flight simulators with our fire support trainers. Future Modeling and Simulation [M&S] simulators and/or training devices must be reconfigurable, using open standards, and non-proprietary source code. Although these requirements may run contrary to the bottom line profit instincts of corporate leadership, the Marine Corps needs industry to design training software and training systems using open standards and protocols that give the taxpayers better return on their investment and avoid proprietary interfaces and solutions. Industry should provide TECOM with a business model that offers the best training solutions that meet our requirements. By maximizing participation in Industry Days and other similar venues, industry can get a better idea of the Marine Corps training and simulation requirements and meet our needs. Industry would then waste less of their time and resources developing material solutions that are not associated with our requirements and then trying to sell the Marine Corps those inappropriate solutions. Industry can also help TECOM by providing a maintenance strategy that increases training availability at the same time reducing the Operations and Maintenance life cycle costs. Industry will deliver what the USMC asks for and pays for; however, the USMC has not always been clear about what it needs. Before we ask “What can industry do to best help TECOM accomplish its mission?” the USMC must act first. The USMC must do at least two (2) things: First, industry is a profit-making body and even the most patriotic organization has a duty to make a profit. Hence, despite the fact that we are a nation at war we must provide industry with the financial incentives to address the USMC’s training needs. We need to identify what funds can be made available for increased training, increased training M&S, increased simulator training, etc. In addition, we need to ensure that SYSCOM allocates the needed training sub-elements and budgets for training devices and associated support for all programs [vehicles, weapons systems, etc.] Second, on another note, until M&S and simulators are built into the [ground] T&R Manuals meaningful standards-based M&S training will not take place. Here too we must act first.
Q: What is the future of TECOM and what role will it play in ensuring Marines are prepared to meet the challenges of present and future operational environments?
A: We will never be able to fully predict all the requirements of future operational environments. However, so long as we produce Marines that can think and adapt to changing situations, then we will ensure that the Marine Corps will be able to continue to fight and win our nation’s wars. That is TECOM’s role now, and in the future. ♦





